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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORENZO C. FORSEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
E. GIRARD HALE, as Executor 
of the Will and Estate of Mabel 
Bean Forsey, Deceased, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 9598 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent brought an action against the ap-
pellant, E. Girard Hale, as Executor of the Will 
and Estate of Mabel Bean Forsey, deceased, for 
recovery of sums paid for the last illne'ss and funeral 
expenses of deceased. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent was awarded a summary judg-
ment by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson of the 
Third District Court, and it is from this summary 
judgment that appellant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judg-
ment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased was named beneficiary under a 
group insurance health and accident plan of the 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company (Exhi-
bit P-1), which was issued to the Utah Furniture 
Association and showed the name of Lorenzo C. 
Forsey as the insured. 
Pursuant to the terms of said policy, Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Company paid the total 
sum of $1205.41 direct to the hospital and doctors 
for the last illness of the deceased. 
The respondent, Lorenzo C. Forsey, after the 
death of the deceased, made a claim on the estate 
of the deceased, pursuant to Section 75-9-21 Utah 
Code Annotated 195'3, for moneys paid for the last 
illness and funeral expenses of deceased. The appel-
lant, E. Girard Hale, 'aS executor of the estate of 
deceased, refused said claim, and an action was 
commenced in the Third District Court for the re-
covery of said sums · ('R. 1, 2) . 
At the time of the pretrial conference (R. 9, 
10), it was stipulated that the only amount in con-
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troversy 'vas the su1n of $1205.41, 'vhich was paid 
by the insurance company for the last illness of 
the deceased. The parties then each moved for sum-
mary judgment based on the foregoing facts and 
contentions of the parties: It being respondent's 
contention that if respondent is not entitled to re-
cover the sum as paid by the insurance carrier for 
the last illness, then the estate of decedent will be 
unjustly enriched. It being appellant's contention 
that it was not a payment of respondent's moneys 
that were paid for said amounts referred to above, 
but was a payment by the insurance company and, 
therefore, respondent was not entitled to recover, 
and further, that this is not a claim for reimburse-
ment the court should make, because the respondent 
has not paid out any moneys for the last illness of 
the deceased. 
The court then instructed the respective parties 
to prepare briefs (R. 15-24), and upon reading the 
briefs the court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment (R. 25, 26), said judgment 
being subseqtlently amended (R. 27, 28) in the 
amount of $2573.17, together with interest. 
Subsequent to said amended summary judg-
ment, appellant and respondent entered into a stipu-
lation for part payment of the judgment in the 
amount of $1460.00, said sums not being contested 
by the parties in this appeal. Therefore, the only 
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amount i11 controversy being that paid by the in-
surance company for the last illness of the deceased. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
All that the respondent was, was an insured 
and beneficiary under the terms of a group insur-
ance policy, the same as his wife, Mabel Bean Forsey. 
The only basis upon which the respondent could 
recover would be under and by virtue of the statute 
under Section 75-9-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
In other words, his claim must be one entitled under 
and by virtue of said section. We feel that the doc-
trine of restitution and unjust enrichment cannot 
and, of course, does not apply. 
In the case of Straube v. Bowling Green Gas 
Co., (Mo. 1950) 18 A.L.R. 1335, 227 S.W. 2d 666, 
the co11rt in that case clearly sets forth the general 
rule, and that is that the theory of unjust enrich-
ment necessarily depends upon whether, by the re-
ceipt of the funds in controversy, the defendant in 
this case was enriched at the loss and expense of 
the plaintiff. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs 
when he has and retains money or benefits which 
in justice and equity belong to another. 
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Un(ler no condition could it be said tlnder the 
facts in this case that there is any evidence that the 
respondent suffered a loss or expense in which the 
deceased \Vas enriched. Unjust enrichment arises 
not only wl1ere an expenditure by one person adds 
to the property of another, but also where the ex-
penditure saves the other from expense or loss. There 
is no evidence whatsoever here that there was loss 
or expense in any particular. Particularly, was 
there no loss or expense aggregating the amount 
of the alleged claim due the respondent in view of 
the fact that the expense of the last illness was paid 
to the doctors and hospital by the group insurance 
carrier. 46 Am. Jur. 99. 
POINT II. 
TO HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST THE ES-
TATE OF THE DECEASED UNDER SECTION 7·5-9-21 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, RESPONDENT MUST 
HAVE PAID OUT OF HIS OWN FUND'S THE EX-
PENSES OF THE LAST ILLNESS OF D'ECEASED. 
Section 75-9-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
governs the payment of the expenses of the last 
illness or sickness, and provides as follows: 
The executor or administrator, as soon as 
he has sufficient funds in his hands, must 
pay the funeral expenses and expenses of the 
last sickness * * *. 
It is the contention of the appellant that it was 
a group insurance plan, and not the respondent 
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Forsey, who paid a portion of the last illness ex-
penses of the deceased and, therefore, under the 
above quoted section, respondent had no claim on 
the estate for reimbursement because respondent 
had not paid out any moneys for the last illness of 
the deceased. The group health and accident insur-
ance plan in question was issued by the Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Company to the Utah Fur-
niture Association, having as its coverage Utah 
Furniture Association members and their employees 
and dependents. The particular insurance policy in 
question (Exhibit P-1) was issued by the insurance 
company to the Utah Furniture Association, and 
deceased was designated as beneficiary and respon-
dent as the insured. There is no evidence, however, 
as to whether respondent or a Furniture Company 
paid the premiums on this policy, although the letter 
of explanation on the inside cover of said policy, 
in referring to the insured, states that: 
"'* * * We urge you to show appreciation of 
the fact that your employer is paying a sub-
stantial portion of your premiun1." 
The Utah case of Columbia Tr1tst Co. v. An-
glum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089, 1093 (1924), lays 
down the general rule as to what claims are allowed 
under Section 75-9-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
.for the payment of the last illness expenses of de-
·ceased by a third person. In this case the widow of 
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the deceased paid for the expenses of the last sick-
ness of the deceased, and the court in allowing her 
to be reimbursed from the estate in payment for 
such moneys expended, stated: 
"Hospital dues and medical attendance are 
charges proper to be presented to and allowed 
against an estate, and if paid by another are 
proper charges to be allowed such person for 
the money so advanced if reasona·ble in 
amount." 
Thus the court held that payment by another other 
than the deceased for last illness expenses is entitled 
to reimbursement for moneys so advanced. In the 
case at bar, the insurance carrier, and not Forsey, 
paid for the last illness expenses of the deceased. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, In 
Re Ra1tdle's Estate, 20 N.W. 2d 464, 465 (1945), 
held that where the widow of the deceased made no 
advancements from her own funds to pay the funeral 
expenses of the deceased, but made payment from 
funds turned over to her by the United Mine Work-
ers for the purpose of paying deceased's funeral 
bill, that she couldn't get reimbursement from the 
estate for moneys which did not come out of her 
own personal funds. In fact, the court held that 
since the widow received $17 4.00 from the United 
Mine Workers funeral fund and paid only $122.75 
of this sum for funeral expenses, leaving $46.25 
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for the estate to pay, that the widow was not en-
titled to any refund for the $122.75, and also that 
the widow was to be charged the amount of $46.25 
which the estate had paid for funeral expenses. In 
other words, the widow would be unjustly enriched 
if she could use the $174.00 from the United Mine 
Workers fund to pay for funeral expenses, and then 
be reimbursed that amount by the estate. It would 
likewise be unjust enrichment for respondent to 
claim the full amount of moneys paid by the insur-
ance company for the last illness of the deceased. 
There are many other cases holding that to have 
a claim against an estate of a decedent, that sums 
paid for funeral expenses or last illnesses must be 
advanced by the person making the claim. The case 
of Smith vs. Eichner, 215 Wash. P. 27 (19'23), held 
that a husband of a deceased wife was entitled to 
reimbursement because he had actually paid out of 
his own resources expenses of the last illness. Other 
cases are In Re Abramowitz' Estate, 9 N.Y. Supp. 
2d 846 ( 1939), and Andrade v. Azevedo, 50 P. 2d 
80 (C. A. Calif. 1935) . 
POTNT III. 
TO HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST THE ES-
TATE OF THE DECEASED FOR THE EXPENSES 
OF THE LAST ILLNESS, THERE MUST ALSO BE A 
DE1BT oF A PE·cuNIARY NATURE WHICH co·ULD 
HAVE BE'EN ENFORCED AGAINST DECEASED IN 
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1-fER LJFETIME AND REDUCED TO A SIMPLE 
MONEY JUDGMENT. 
The rule is well established in 34 C.J.S. 95 that 
the word "claims" : 
"* * * has reference only to such debts or de-
mands against decedent as might have been 
enforced against him in his lifetime by per-
sonal action for the recovery of money, and 
on which only a money judgment could have 
been rendered". 
This rule is also stated in 21 Am. Jur. 579. 
It should be noted, however, that funeral ex-
penses are an exception to the above quoted rule, 
because as stated in Bancroft's Probate Practice, 
2nd Edition, Volume 3, p·ages 532, 533: 
"Funeral expenses are not properly a 'claim' 
against the estate in the sense of being an 
obligation contracted or incurred by the de-
cedent. Neither are they expenses of admin-
istration. They are rather a charge against 
the estate which the law authorizes because 
of the dictates of society, * * *" 
Thus, it is important to draw a distinction between 
the expenses of the last illness and the expenses of 
funeral expenses, because in the case of the expenses 
of the last illness there is a debt contracted or in-
curred by deceased during his or her lifetime, while 
in the case of funeral expenses there is hardly ever 
a debt contracted for or authorized by decedent 
during his lifetime. 
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One of the leadiig cases in defining what con-
stitutes a claim against the estate of a deceased is 
Tinkham v. Tinkham, 45 Ind. N. E. 2d 357, 360 
( 1942), which is very explicit in defining what 
constitutes a claim against an estate. The court in 
substance stated that a claim within a statute re-
lating to an action against an executor or adminis-
trator is a debt or demand of a pecuniary nature 
which could be enforced against decedent in his 
lifetime and could be reduced to a simple money 
judgment. This same doctrine is also affirmed In 
Re Iverson's Appeal, 81 Minn. N. W. 2d 701 (1957), 
and Ree.dy v. Alexander, 30 Miss. S. 2d 599, 601 
(1947). The case of Gilbre~ath v. Line, 119 S. 2d 210 
(Ala. 1955), held that there must be a relationship 
of debtor and creditor between deceased and the 
claimant to have a valid claim against the deceased's 
debt. 
It is obvious that when decedent died there was 
no debt owing to respondent for her last illness, 
as the insurance company had already paid the debt 
and, therefore, respondent could not have enforced 
the debt against decedent in her lifetime and re-
duced the debt to a simple money judgn1ent. Dece-
dent satisfied the expenses of her last illness under 
question in this case by virtue of the fact that she 
was a beneficiary of a group health and accident 
insurance plan, and at the time of her death she did 
10 
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not owe respondent or anyone else for the expenses 
of her last illness. To hold that a member or em-
ployee of a furniture association, who is listed on 
a group health and accident insurance policy nam-
ing another other than himself as beneficiary, can 
then charge the estate of the deceased beneficiary 
with a claim for the expense of the last illness paid 
by the policy, when he has no claim against the 
deceased which he could have enforced during her 
life, is untenable. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
We feel, without any question, that this claim 
does not come within the provisions of the Utah 
Code Annotated, supra, in any particular. 
It cannot come within the doctrine of restitu-
tion and unjust enrichment; nor is it a claim that 
could have been enforced at the time of the death 
of the decedent. Simply, all this amounts to is the 
fact that a group insurance carrier paid to the 
hospital and doctors under the terms of its policy 
to the beneficiary named therein for performing 
services during the last illness of the deceased. 
If the view of the trial court is correct, then 
the surviving spouses of every group insurance 
policy, where the employer pays the substantial por-
tion of the premium, would be entitled to be unjustly 
enriched from the proceeds of a policy paid by an 
insurance carrier. We think this is, without any 
question, improper and cannot be supported by the 
statutes or any law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLIS'TER & KESLER 
619 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
By _______________________________________________________ _ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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